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Analysis of efficiency and profitability of franchise services 
Abstract 
The present study analyses the relative efficiency of franchise services and 
characterises the best companies, confirming the relationship between efficiency and 
profit. These companies are from "the trade and other services sector", the main group 
of service- providing companies in the Spanish economy. The methodology calls for 
first comparing the relative efficiency of franchiser  and ownership enterprises. 
Second, the focus turns to the most efficient franchise services, using a super-
efficiency model to rank them. The paper then goes n to cover the analysis of the 
main characteristics of the best franchise enterprises, the number of own 
establishments in a franchise business, and the profitability of the company. This 
paper presents arguments as to why companies from the trade and other services 
sector are included. The main conclusion is that, whilst the number of establishments 
is irrelevant in achieving greater efficiency, many of the most efficient enterprises 
have high returns. 





There is no single definition of franchising (Altinay and Miles, 2006; Mendelshon, 
2004) but maybe one of the most concise and comprehensive definitions is given by 
the International Franchise Association (IFA). According to IFA “a franchise operation 
is a contractual relationship between the franchisor and franchisee in which the 
franchisor offers or is obliged to maintain a continuous interest in the business of the 
franchisee in such areas as know-how and training; wherein the franchisee operates 
under a common trade name, format and/or a procedure owned or controlled  by the 
franchisor and in which the franchisee has or will make a substantial capital 
investment in his business from his own resources”. 
Currently this type of relation is a common procedur  for growth in certain 
businesses. Firms which own a well-known brand and want to introduce it to new 
markets consider different options (Baena and Cervino, 2012): from the mere export 
of the product, joint venture or business acquisition or signing agreements with 
businesses already positioned abroad. In this latter case, franchising is a solution to 
the need to expand and adapt to new markets (e. g., countries like China where 
investments of 100% foreign capital are not permitted; Baena and Cervino, 2012). 
Other factors, like the persistence of the economic crisis in many countries, attached 
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to a general decline in bank financing for new projects, have also accelerated the 
search for better business opportunities, favouring the development of franchising. 
Internationally, the Spanish economy is a prime, reliable example of an economy with 
franchises that have a physical presence on all five continents. In Spain, 15% of 
franchises have operations abroad in order to continue increasing sale rates, 
particularly during the current economic crisis. In figures, (Navarro-Garcia, A., 2012) 
Spanish franchising activity has also increased its international presence significantly, 
with a presence in 113 countries and 15,194 foreign premises in 2011. The latter 
figure represents an increase of 21.7% on the previous period, and these trends are set 
to continue in the future. 
This evolution in the franchise system as a mechanism for business expansion has 
been analysed and explained by academic and professional studies. Many of the 
studies examine how franchising can minimise transaction or agency costs, 
(Barthélemy, 2008; Combs et al., 2004; Vazquez, 2008) or, among other aspects, how 
it can be a valid instrument for coping with lack of financial resources or management 
skills (Combs and Ketchen, 1999; Shane et al., 2006). As Coase (1937) notes, a firm’s 
decision to externalise or internalise with franchising or ownership is a core issue for 
economics and organisational theorists. 
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Franchising offers advantages in terms of the facilities provided by the franchisor or 
owner of the brand: support with choosing the site for the new business or technical 
orientation and business guidance for developing the object of the franchise; or the 
advantages for the franchisee of the corporate image or use of a recognised brand. 
These advantages are important for businesses that market products or sell services, 
although for the owner of the brand (or franchisor), customer-related franchising 
activities are vitally important when they involve s lling services. In this case the 
idiosyncratic aspects of the culture and customs in a country or certain locality can be 
resolved better in a franchise by native franchisees, as emerges from the theory of 
standardisation or adaptation of products or servics in different markets.   
(Morschett, 2006; Nasir and Altinbasak, 2009). The sales service of products is, in 
general, more standardised and less idiosyncratic, educing the importance of specific 
knowledge of the individual franchisee”. 
This issue and other aspects related to competition in services, (Ethiraj, Kale, 
Krishnan and Singh, 2005; Nickerson, Hamilton and Wada, 2001) which may be very 
important for researching differences between franchises that market products and 
offer services, are not dealt with in this research. Instead, the current approach is to 
compare the scale of the franchise according to the number of franchised and 
unfranchised units with efficiency, and then compare efficiency with profitability.  
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Finally we discuss aspects of franchise theory where no distinction is made between 
trade or service activities. In this context, we verify whether the businesses selected 
for the franchise sample are more efficient than other comparable firms that have 
retained ownership of their activities; and secondly, based on the efficiency ranking 
for the franchises, we compare as already mentioned, efficiency and profitability. 
Furthermore, justification of the existence of franchises also lies in these businesses’ 
greater efficiency compared with proprietary commercial or service activities 
(Krueger, 1991; Hoffman y Preble, 1994), although Anderson (1984) does not 
consider these differences to be significant; similarly Stern, et al. (1999) justify the 
existence of franchises due to lower risk whereas St nworth, et al. (1998) disagree. 
Thus the reasons that lead a firm to act independently or as part of a franchise is still 
an open question. 
This paper analyses the efficiency of franchisers and ownership enterprises in the 
largest activity sector in Spain, trade and other svices sector, using Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The article is of interest because the studied companies 
(trade and services) come from an economic set of enterprises that is quantitatively 
important in Spain and globally, and because it contributes to the theory on the 
franchising or ownership decision and to the study of the relationships between 
efficiency and profitability. 
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The paper has the following structure. First, the lit rature review helps establish the 
theoretical framework for this research. The second section then contains a 
description of the data and methodology. Afterwards, the paper presents the analysis 
of the efficiency of the services franchises versus the selected control companies, 
describing the variables used as inputs and outputs in he analysis. The subsequent 
section then covers the application of some models to tudy the relative and super-
efficiency of the franchise enterprises, and determine the main characteristic of super-




A fundamental decision for any firm, affecting its efficiency and long-term survival, is 
the way it establishes contractual relationships and control. One of the core issues in 
this area is whether production or the services a firm requires or provides (or the units 
that obtain or supply them) belong to the company or have been outsourced. A 
franchise agreement is a particular case of externalisation through contractual 
agreements. 
Franchising company literature examines many aspect of franchising, all closely 
related to efficiency and productivity: franchising as a strategy to attract partners and 
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increase the size and scale of production (Shane et al., 2006); to attract partners to 
invest in the outlets and thus avoid capital shortages (Combs and Ketchen, 1999); to 
select franchisees with favourable disposition and desirable characteristics that lower 
the agency costs (Saraogi, 2009); the franchise as a way of adapting to local taste or 
as a business format able to develop policies that favour all stakeholders (Meisenberg 
and Ehrmann, 2012) or as a means of facilitating entry to other markets or other 
countries (Combs and Ketchen, 1999).  
The literature also examines the survival or death r e of franchises according to their 
institutional legitimacy (Shane and Foo, 1999) and other institutional aspects (Combs 
et al., 2009). 
According to some authors, contracts that ensure greate  hierarchical control for the 
franchisor are more efficient (Chaudey and Fadairo, 2008, 2010), whereas others 
consider that greater autonomy for franchisees can be compensated by better 
recruitment (Saraogi, 2009), by establishing governance mechanisms other than 
control (Cochet et al., 2008), or by contracts with a soft part (not strictly formal 
agreements) that delivers satisfactory performance and corporate efficiency (Peris-
Ortiz et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the externalisation or internalisation decision, to own or franchise the 
activities and outlets can sometimes involve, in the case of franchisors, a sophisticated 
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combination of internalised and externalised outlets ading to greater efficiency for 
the franchisor company (Kidwell and Nygaard, 2011; Perryman and Combs, 2012; 
Vázquez, 2007).  
Finally, concerning the relationship between efficiency and profitability in the 
empirical study, in some “growth oriented entrepreneurs the desire to reach strategic 
growth goals might require less than optimal organis tional efficiency, at least in the 
short term” (Perryman and Combs, 2012: 375). That is, policies that orient a company 
towards achieving market position and making a profit may not coincide with policies 
that seek greater efficiency. 
In our research we intend to examine this issue to progress in the study of franchise 
efficiency using DEA methodology and one of its extensions, super-efficiency 
analysis. 
 
Data and research methodology. 
As already mentioned various studies have concluded that franchising is a more 
efficient form of organisation than own units. If this is true, we should observe 
significantly different behaviour between units where the only difference is that of 
being a franchise or not.  As in many markets the Spanish franchise covers many 
different sectors (fashion, furniture and home decor, h tels and restaurants, travel 
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agencies, food, hotels, transportation, etc) many of them belong to a key sector 
differentiating modern developed economies, the servic  sector. Therefore, in pursuit 
of our objective, we selected franchises belonging to the trade and other services 
sector. According to the Spanish National Statistics Institute (Annual Trade Survey, 
2011), there are over 2.5 million companies in the trade and other services sector, 
involved in more than twenty areas of economic activity (travel agencies, hotels and 
restaurants, fashion and transport among others). The sector has over 8 million 
employees and a turnover of 1,073,533 million Euros in 2011. These data show the 
relevance of these activities in Spain. 
All the data in this study come from the SABI database. This database gathers annual 
accounts and complementary financial information from over 550,000 Spanish 
companies not including financial enterprises or insurance companies. 
The efficiency of franchise enterprises in the main franchising services sector in 
Spain—wholesale trade, trade intermediaries, and retail trade (except motor vehicles 
and motorbikes)—is assessed using DEA methodology. We chose this sector from the 
2009 National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE), which identifies 
companies in the same sector by assigning a common code. This sector contains a 
significant volume of enterprises that are very important for the Spanish economy, 
such as “Carrefour, SA”, “Merkamueble Europa, SA”, “Grupo Massimo Dutti SA”, 
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and “Bershka BSK España SA”. Although these companies engage in services, 
providing products or goods, important companies also operate in trading services. 
Examples of such companies include: “Canal Ocio Europa”, dedicated to export, 
import and distribution of films and video games; “The Bymovil Spain SL”, dedicated  
to the study and programming of mechanical and electroni  equipment; and 
“Eurosystem Ofimatica SL”, which offers computer sevices to companies. 
 The empirical study first aims to determine whether franchises are more efficient for 
resource management than other comparable enterprises. To determine relative 
efficiency, we analyse the selected franchise enterprises together with a sample of 
non-franchise enterprises or control enterprises. These control enterprises are a good 
reference for the study because they belong to the same economic sector as the 
franchise enterprises, the same location and have a similar dimension. The control 
sample was chosen based on the CNAE classification. 
Secondly, after analysing the efficiency of franchise enterprises versus the control 
enterprises, we analyse the relative efficiency of franchise services. Once the 
comparative is made, the study goes on with the aim of determine the level of 
efficiency of the franchise enterprises in the study, the ranking of the efficient 
companies and the characteristics than make one frachise enterprise more efficient 
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than others. For this purpose, we only analyse franchise enterprises that made a profit 
in 2009. 
Accounting ratios provide a broad measure of efficien y, but now there are alternative 
models for analysing the technical efficiency of a group of units in a more complex 
and real context. DEA methodology (or Data Envelopment Analysis), proposed 
initially by Charnes et al. (1978), is based on lineal programming that allows to 
evaluate the relative efficiency and the productivity of a group of organisations or 
individuals, generally known as DMUs, by comparing puts and outputs with all the 
other DMUs. 
DEA methodology has been widely applied in a large number of articles with 
theoretical extensions and many different applications (Emrouznejad et al., 2008 
presents a good survey of these papers). 
In the franchise context, some authors have applied other methodologies for studying 
the efficiency of franchise companies. For instance, D  Jonghe and Vander (2008), 
introduce a modified Tobin’s Q ratio to measure European banks franchise value and 
their efficiency; and Tan et al. (2010), investigate the properties of Pareto-efficient in 
the private provision of public roads through build–operate-transfer contracts using a 
bi-objective programming approach under perfect information. 
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Despite the above, most studies of franchising effici ncy use DEA techniques. For 
example, Tsaur (2000) measures the relative efficiency of international tourist hotels 
in Taiwan; Anderson et al. (2000) analyse hotel effici ncy using DEA methodology 
and another stochastic frontier technique in a sample of 48 hotels in USA; Chiu et al 
(2008) applies a BCC model to evaluate a bank’s technical efficiency in Taiwan; 
Hwang and Chang (2003) evaluate the efficiency of management of a hotel chain in 
Taiwan; Roh and Choi (2010) study efficiency between multiple brands in a restaurant 
franchising chain operating in the Pacific Rim; and Pulina et al. (2010) analyse the 
relationship between size and efficiency in the Italian hospitality sector. 
Many papers compare the efficiency of franchised companies versus non-franchised 
units and Anderson et al. (1998) and Yoo et al. (1998) underline the power of DEA 
methods in comparing franchised and non-franchised units. Anderson et al. (1998) 
apply DEA methodology to compare efficiency between a sample of unaffiliated real 
estate brokerage firms and a group of affiliated enterprises and Yoo et al. (1998) 
analyse the superiority of franchised companies in the refreshment place industry. As 
other examples, Botti et al. (2009) analyses efficin y with DEA models of franchises 
versus other organisational forms in French hotel chains; and Perrigot et al. (2009) 
compare performance and efficiency between plural form chains (chains with 
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franchised hotels and company-owned hotels) and some mostly franchised hotel 
chains in the French market. 
Despite the wide application of DEA methods to franchise efficiency analysis, there 
are only a few investigations in a Spanish context. For instance, Giménez et al. (2007) 
uses a three-step DEA to reallocate resources in restaurant locations belonging to a 
Spanish fast-food chain; Alonso de Magdaleno et al. (2009) looks at whether the 
contractual forms of hotel chains influence efficiency, focusing on the Melia Hotel. 
Although a previous investigation (Garcia et al., 201 ) analyses the relative efficiency 
of franchise firms in different sectors using a non-c cave metafrontier model based 
on DEA methodology, in this paper we propose a different analysis applied to the 
enterprise framework in Spain. Concretely, we focus the study on the relative 
efficiency analysis and super-efficiency of the trade and other services sector, which is 
the main set of franchising enterprises as described pr viously. 
 
Efficiency analysis of franchise services versus control companies 
The first aim of our study is to evaluate if franchise companies are more efficient than 
similar companies in the same sector. For this purpose, we selected 143 franchises in 
the trade and other services sector in Spain (except for motor vehicles and 
motorbikes). Most of these companies engage in services, providing products or 
goods such as furniture, fashion, nourishment, and the like, but the sample also 
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contains 23 companies (16% of the sample) that offer trading services such as 
business consulting, or computers and electronic equipment programming. We have 
chosen only the companies where information for the analysis was available and no 
errors in the data were detected. 
To compare the efficiency of these companies with oer similar ownership 
enterprises, we chose a control sample with the same number of companies 143, in a 
similar geographical location, registered in the same sector (identified by the same 
activity codes) as the selected franchises. 
Efficiency focuses on the relationship between inputs and outputs of the analysed 
companies. In the DEA application, the input and output selection is one of the weak 
aspects of the analysis due to its subjectivity. Therefore, the analyst must choose input 
and output variables that are representative of the resources and objectives of the 
companies in the sample. 
This study uses five input variables: tangible fixed assets, intangible assets, the total 
volume of own resources, total liabilities and labour costs for the 2009 financial year. 
With these results the enterprises must achieve some results or outputs in DEA 




These measures are good indicators of financial effici ncy and some of them appear 
as inputs or outputs in the DEA literature (Fuchs, 2004; Pulina et al., 2010). 
After solving the DEA problem (BCC model with input orientation, initially proposed 
by Banker et al. in 1984) with the “DEA-Solver-PRO program”, we obtain an 
efficiency score for each franchise enterprises and the control enterprises.  
Summarising these results, Figure 1 shows the results for the franchise enterprises and 
for the control companies. Figure 1 groups efficieny into different levels. For 
example, the highest level of efficiency, (unitary score) was reached in 2009 by 31% 
of franchise enterprises. Thus 31% of franchise servic s are totally efficient, followed 
by 4% of enterprises that achieved efficiency betwen 0.8 and 0.99. At the opposite 
end of efficiency are 30 % of franchise services, which achieved scores between 0 and 
0.19.  
In relation to the control companies, Figure 1 shows that 60% of the enterprises 
obtained the maximum efficiency score, whereas 4% were less efficient control 
companies achieved (scores between 0 and 0.19).  
###Insert Figure 1 here### 
 
Comparative analysis of these figures suggests that being a franchise or a franchisor 
does not mean that the enterprise will manage its resources more efficiently. 
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Franchises are an increasingly widespread contractual form in Spain, but they do not 
guarantee efficiency. 
This results, although contrary to the thesis maintained by some authors and 
supported empirically by studies such as, for example, those mentioned previously in 
this work, is in line with the findings of other studies. Thus for example, Alonso et al., 
(2009) analyse the efficiency of the Spanish hotel system and after studying the 
specific case of the Sol Meliá hotel chain conclude that there are no contractual 
formulas more efficient than others. The same conclusion is reached by Anderson 
(1984) and Bracker and Pearson (1986) who, after analysi g other markets, find no 
significant differentiating behaviour in own firm and franchises. 
The following step in this paper is to focus on relative efficiency analysis of franchise 
services. This analysis enables us to determine if efficiency in the chosen companies 
improves when they are compared only with each other, what levels of efficiency 
predominate and subsequently, the characteristics of the most efficient franchise 
services. 
 
Relative efficiency and super-efficiency of franchise enterprises 
After proving that franchise enterprises are not more efficient than the control 
enterprises, the second objective is to research the relative and super-efficiency of 
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franchiser companies and characterise the most efficient enterprises by attempting to 
show the differentiating elements that cause greate or lesser efficiency. 
Knowledge of the best enterprises is an important reference for taking management 
decisions. Therefore, many different hierarchical procedures have been developed for 
this purpose in the literature.  
In the franchise context, there are some franchise ranking publications, like the 
“Entrepreneur Magazine’s Annual Franchise 500” that provides a ranking of the top 
500 franchise companies worldwide. This ranking is intended as a tool to start a 
franchise search and depends on factors like the financial strength and stability of the 
system, the time the company has been franchising or the franchises’ financial data. 
Obviously, it is a completely alternative ranking that should not be able to rank the 
enterprises analysed in this paper. 
This new efficiency analysis uses the same methodology as the previous study, that is, 
the BCC model with input orientation. Now, however, the analysis only considers 96 
franchiser enterprises with positive returns in 2009. First, because super-efficiency 
models (applied later to rank the efficient units) a sume that inputs and outputs of the 
problem are non-negative variables, and second, becaus  in our opinion, it is not 
worth analysing the efficiency of loss-making enterprises as the loss suggests that 
they have been unable to optimise resource management. 
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The inputs and outputs selected in this new efficiency analysis are the same as in the 
last application, adding two new inputs: the number of own establishments and the 
number of franchise businesses. The addition of these new variables is supported by 
the thesis of some authors (Baena and Cervino, 2012) that franchisor size is one of the 
significant variables in the expansion of a franchise chain.   
The scores obtained for profitable franchise enterprises with the BCC model (see 
Figure 2) reflect an important improvement in efficiency betw en these enterprises, 
when they are not compared with control companies. As Figure 2 shows only 23% of 
the studied firms obtain scores below 0.5 and 58% (56 out of 96) analysed franchise 
services achieve the unitary score.  
 
###Insert Figure 2 here### 
There is a drawback if “top efficient status” is held by many DMUs as it is not 
possible to discriminate between them and select th leading DMUs in the group. 
To find out if DMUs with unitary scores really do have the same relative efficiency, 
we need to implement a new methodology that offers a procedure for obtaining a 
hierarchical ranking of DMUs.  
In the DEA context, different ranking procedures have been developed and applied. 
Adler et al. (2002) offer an excellent review of the main ranking methods used with 
DEA methodology, concluding that each technique is useful in a specific area but 
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there is no unique solution for every analysis. Other authors, like Bosca et al. (2011), 
propose a ranking method that assumes the resolution of a set of DEA-FDH models 
with possible variations of inputs and outputs, in a fuzzy context. Following this 
investigation, Medal and Sala (2011) propose a similar h erarchical method with FDH 
methodology, which considers the variation coefficients condition in an uncertain 
context. Liu and Peng (2008) rank the units according to their efficiency score 
weighted by a set of weights. Reza et al. (2007) offer a new ranking system for 
extreme efficient DMUs based upon the omission of these efficient DMUs from a 
reference set. Finally, Tsou and Huangb (2010) propose a model named performance 
baseline that can be used to rank DMUs, providing a common basis for performance 
comparison. 
Despite the competence and value of those techniques, in this paper we use super-
efficiency methodology to rank the efficient DMUs, due to the characteristics of the 
data selected. 
Super-efficiency models are an extension of the DEA method that measures the effect 
of excluding DMU under evaluation from the referenc set. This procedure shrinks 
the production set and allows efficient DMUs to become super-efficient, with super- 
efficiency scores above the unit. Nevertheless, the scores of the inefficient units do 
not change, that is, they have the same level as in the standard models. This 
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methodology allows an efficient unit k to achieve a score higher than one, removing 
the kth constraint in the mathematical formulation of the problem, as shown in 
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Adler et al., 2002, describe this methodology as a ranking process in the DEA context, 
and identify three problematic areas in this analysis. 
The first problem is associated with the weights used to evaluate unit efficiency. The 
objective function value of the DEA problem designed by Andersen and Petersen, 
(1993), gives a rank score for all units, but each unit is evaluated according to 
different weights.  
Second, the super-efficiency methodology can give “specialised” units an excessively 
high ranking. Therefore, enterprises that are especially good at managing one or more 
of their inputs can determine the DEA frontier, conditioning the score efficiency of the 
rest of the units. This drawback concerns the existnce of outliers or influent units, but 
it is not a problem in our analysis. Nevertheless, Sueyoshi (1999) developed a new 
formulation for the super-efficiency problem that avoids this problem. 
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Finally, the third problem refers to the fact than some super-efficient DEA models can 
be infeasible. In such cases, the super-efficiency method cannot provide a complete 
ranking of the units selected. Zhu (1996), Seiford and Zhu (2001) analyse which 
conditions make a super-efficient DEA model infeasible, and Mehrabian et al. (1999) 
suggest a modification to the problem formulation in order to avoid this limitation.  
Despite these limitations, super-efficiency models have been broadly applied in the 
literature for different purposes. For instance, Banker et al. (1989) used this 
methodology to screen out outliers in the set of DMUs; Charnes and Neralic (1992), 
Seiford and Zhu (1998) and Zhu (2001) developed several new super-efficiency 
models to analyse the sensitivity of efficient DMUs and determine efficiency stability 
regions; Andersen and Petersen (1993) and Noura et al. (2011) employed the super-
efficiency model to rank efficient units and discriminate performance among efficient 
DMUs, and Avkiran (2011) uses DEA super-efficiency for estimating the relationship 
between efficiency and financial ratios in banks. 
In this paper we use the super-efficiency model to rank DMUs (following Andersen 
and Petersen, 1993) with a BCC equivalent model (with input orientation) introduced 
by Lovell and Rouse (2003). We obtain new super-effici ncy scores for the 56 DMUs 
that were classified as completely efficient in thepr vious analysis, enabling us to 
establish a hierarchical order between them. Due to the physical limitations of this 
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paper, Table 1 shows the top ten franchise services from the dataselected. This table 
shows the ranking of the top ten franchise services from the super-efficiency analysis.  
###Insert Table 1 here### 
Starting from the given DMU ranking of the most efficient franchise services with 
profits, the following step is to characterise the most efficient enterprises. Table 1 also 
shows the variables selected for this purpose: the total number of establishments of 
each company (own establishments and franchise businesses) and the ROE ratio 
(return on equity), defined by equation (2). 
 
resourcesown   
  taxesand  interests  before  returns
ROE=     (2) 
 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the rank and the total number of 
establishments (own and franchise business) for the top ten enterprises. Although 
initially it might seem that the best enterprises are those that have achieved a large 
number of own establishments or franchises, Figure 3 makes it clear that the number 
of establishments is not a relevant variable for greater efficiency. For instance, 
whereas the second firm (The Bymovil Spain S.L.) has 158 establishments (9 own 




###Insert Figure 3 here### 
Nevertheless, if we represent the ROE for the top fifteen franchise services depending 
on the established ranking (Figure 4), it can be seen that many of the most efficient 
enterprises have high returns. For instance, the second company (The Bymovil Spain 
S.L.) had a very high ROE in 2009 of 202.48%. Although the sample firms show 
differences in profitability, the average ROE for the 15 most efficient businesses is 
53.35%. 
###Insert Figure 4 here### 
In summary, profitability and efficiency are not the same. Profitability measures a 
business's ability to generate earnings while effici n y determines an enterprise’s 
capacity to obtain maximum output with its own resources or its capacity to achieve 
the same results with the minimum inputs. In our case, the most efficient enterprises 
are those that have been able to obtain their outputs (sales and returns in 2009) with 
the minimum level of inputs (assets, own resources, liabilities and workers). 




This article aims to analyse efficiency in a set of franchise services in the trade and 
other services sector on two levels: in comparison with non-franchise enterprises in 
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the same sector (control sample) and comparing them exclusively with each other 
using DEA methodology. 
The results show that franchise services are not more efficient than other similar 
enterprises. Franchising does not ensure that the company’s resources are managed 
more efficiently. 
Comparison of the franchise enterprises with each other suggests that the valuation of 
most companies improves and most of them are evaluated as being totally efficient 
(unitary score). This finding makes it difficult toselect the companies that really are 
the most efficient and so we propose the use of the sup r-efficiency Model.  
The application of this model enables a ranking to be established between the units 
(franchises) and suggests that efficiency is not linked to the number of establishments 
in a franchise (whether ownership or franchise enterprises). The link, however, 
becomes clear when relating the ranking in Table 1 to franchise profitability measured 
by ROE (Figure 4). In general, the higher the ranking, the greater the ROE. That is, 
the most efficient franchisors show better financial results, although this is not always 
fulfilled in each particular case.   
One of the contributions of this study is to separate efficiency and profit as measures 
of performance and then examine the way they relate to each other when comparing 
franchises in the trade and other services sector. The economics and business 
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literature, including the franchising literature, implicitly assumes that greater 
efficiency leads to higher profits and vice versa, but depending on the measurement 
method and the set of companies, this assumption may not necessarily hold true.  
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Top ten scores of profitable franchise services 
Super-
efficiency 





1 Merkamueble Europa S.A. 50.59% 4 71 
2 The Bymovil Spain S.L. 202.48% 9 149 
3 Ars Rei S.L. 25.52% 26 0 
4 Congelats Flor De Neu S.L. 12.50% 7 1 
5 Onipse Canarias SL. 99.61% 0 28 
6 Boskuchen S.L. 20.00% 1 3 
7 No es pecado S.L. 17.78% 0 17 
8 Servifruit Gomab S.L. 13.95% 14 10 
9 




10 Condis Supermercats S.A. 9.63% 202 234 
 
Figure 3 





Return on Equity for 10 most efficient franchise services 
 
